What To Do About the Houthis
Airstrikes have failed to quell their antics. What now?
Vice President Vance’s apprehension regarding further military action against the Houthis proved one of the more interesting revelations from the administration’s Signal leak.
In the group chat, he posted:
Team, I am out for the day doing an economic event in Michigan. But I think we are making a mistake.
3 percent of US trade runs through the suez. 40 percent of European trade does. There is a real risk that the public doesn’t understand this or why it’s necessary. The strongest reason to do this is, as POTUS said, to send a message.
I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now. There’s a further risk that we see a moderate to severe spike in oil prices.
I am willing to support the consensus of the team and keep these concerns to myself. But there is a strong argument for delaying this a month, doing the messaging work on why this matters, seeing where the economy is, etc.
In other words, Europe is more affected by the Houthi’s shipping disruption than America – yet, while chastizing Europe for not carrying its own weight, the Trump administration is coming to its rescue. Whatever one thinks of this approach to foreign policy, it is more than a little inconsistent.
Still, there’s no doubt that putting an end to the Houthis’ disruptive antics is in the best interests of America and its allies. It is entirely morally and strategically warranted. Anyone telling you otherwise is delusional.
As noted in The American Conservative:
First, there’s no question that Houthi missile and drone attacks on vessels in the Red Sea have forced a significant change in how shippers get their goods to market. When the Yemeni rebel group first started attacking ships in the fall of 2023, in professed solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza, cargo companies and insurers decided to re-route their assets away from this turbulent region. The long, costlier journey around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope was the safer option.
The proof is in the numbers: According to the UK’s Office of National Statistics, the Suez Canal experienced a 66 percent reduction in the amount of crossings between December 2023 and April 2024. This year, the numbers still aren’t where they were prior to the Houthi attacks. Lloyd’s List Intelligence finds that last month nearly 200 container ships passed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, an increase from the same time last year but still far below what it was pre-November 2023, when the Houthis started lobbing missiles.
That improvement suggests that the Biden administration’s Operation Prosperity Guardian, launched Dec. 2023, was not entirely effective. There are certainly multiple reasons for that, but a big one is the cost differential: the U.S. is shooting down $2,000 drones with $2M missiles. And when in turn we launch strikes on them, some damage is done, but it isn’t clear how much. We can conclude not a lot given that the Houthis remain undeterred.
As Middle East analyst Steven Simon outlines, striking the Houthis is complicated business:
At the tactical level, the Houthis enjoy substantial territorial depth, which, combined with the range of their munitions, greatly complicates effective targeting of mobile launchers. The needles are in a vast haystack. The distributed production and storage of platforms and warheads also make targeting a difficult proposition. An economist would say that the United States would face a classic stock/flow problem: Given the size of existing stockpiles, interfering with marginal increases in the stockpiles will yield meager results. And these stockpiles are probably quite large, although no one knows just how large. And despite the large number of Houthi strikes since 2023, expenditure rates have been relatively modest. Moreover, there is the ample historical evidence for the ineffectiveness of airstrikes in the absence of synchronized ground maneuver.
That last part is significant. Without boots on the ground to control Houthi territory and infrastructure, airstrikes on their own are unlikely to prove effective. But we don’t want to go down that path. Committing American troops to another ill-fated Middle Eastern war is decidedly at odds with Trump’s foreign policy.
Nevertheless, something must be done about the Houthis. Failure to restore order to the Red Sea will make America look weak and ineffective – to both our allies and our adversaries.
Military action has thus far failed. As such, perhaps it is time to consider a diplomatic approach. The Houthis, while hostile, are not irrational actors. The same goes for their allies.
There’s reason to believe that a lasting ceasefire between Israel and Hamas would quell Houthi aggression. The Gaza War is, after all, their primary grievance. But there’s the possibility that they’ve taken a liking to messing with global trade. You’ve probably seen the TikToks. They’re in the news every day. They’re getting clouted up. Who wants to give up clout?
Assuming that isn’t the case, diplomacy could work. Simon suggested as much in July 2024:
So, what should the United States do? In lieu of escalating militarily, the administration’s first instinct may be to double down on sanctions. But sanctions nearly always strengthen autocratic actors while punishing ordinary people. So that is not a great idea, especially when Yemen is already suffering from humanitarian disaster. Step number one, therefore, should be to keep pushing for a ceasefire in Gaza. At this stage, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu are not quite prepared to get to yes, but Secretary of State Tony Blinken says the parties are within the 10-yard line. If that is the case, Houthi intentions will at least be clarified. The second, working with the United Nations, would be to establish a contact group consisting of Houthi representatives, Saudis, Emiratis, the Palestinian Authority, China, Russia, the European Union, and other participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Allison Minor, the former deputy envoy for Yemen, makes a powerful case for this sort of diplomatic approach based on her impression of dynamics at the U.N. Security Council. Its job will be keeping the Houthi leadership focused on resolving the conflict from which they clearly benefit. Although the Houthis thus far have waved off Saudi inducements, the larger contact group might be able to sweeten the pot. Separately, Washington should engage Beijing and Moscow directly or through intermediaries to press them to persuade Iran and the Houthi leadership to lower the temperature, define more specifically their requirement for a ceasefire in the Red Sea, and establish rules of the road for the future. And, in combination with these steps, the United States will need to continue to urge Israel to keep its nerve, focus on defensive measures, and, of course, agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. None of these steps will yield miracles given the unpromising conditions, but they are better than the alternative.
Of course, there’s a good chance that the above would also fail. But seeing as how our current strategy has already failed, there’s no harm in adopting a new approach.
🔥 Ty